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Fig. 1. Augmented poster. Among many applications enabled by our FontCode method, here we create a poster embedded with an unobtrusive optical
barcode (le). The poster uses text fonts that look almost identical from the standard Times New Roman, and has no traditional black-and-white barcode
paern. But our smartphone application allows the user to take a snapshot (right) and decode the hidden message, in this case, a Youtube link (middle).
We introduce FontCode, an information embedding technique for text docu-
ments. Provided a text document with specic fonts, our method embeds
user-specied information in the text by perturbing the glyphs of text char-
acters while preserving the text content. We devise an algorithm to choose
unobtrusive yet machine-recognizable glyph perturbations, leveraging a
recently developed generative model that alters the glyphs of each char-
acter continuously on a font manifold. We then introduce an algorithm
that embeds a user-provided message in the text document and produces an
encoded document whose appearance is minimally perturbed from the orig-
inal document. We also present a glyph recognition method that recovers
the embedded information from an encoded document stored as a vector
graphic or pixel image, or even on a printed paper. In addition, we introduce
a new error-correction coding scheme that recties a certain number of
recognition errors. Lastly, we demonstrate that our technique enables a
wide array of applications, using it as a text document metadata holder, an
unobtrusive optical barcode, a cryptographic message embedding scheme,
and a text document signature.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Font manifold, glyph perturbation, error
correction coding, text document signature
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1 INTRODUCTION
Information embedding, the technique of embedding a message into
host data, has numerous applications: Digital photographs have
metadata embedded to record such information as capture date,
exposure time, focal length, and camera’s GPS location. Watermarks
embedded in images, videos, and audios have been one of the most
important means in digital production to claim copyright against
piracies [Bloom et al. 1999]. And indeed, the idea of embedding
information in light signals has grown into an emerging eld of
visual light communication (e.g., see [Jo et al. 2016]).
In all these areas, information embedding techniques meet two
desiderata: (i) the host medium is minimally perturbed, implying
that the embedded message must be minimally intrusive; and (ii)
the embedded message can be robustly recovered by the intended
decoder even in the presence of some decoding errors.
Remaining reclusive is the information embedding technique for
text documents, in both digital and physical form. While explored
by many previous works on digital text steganography, information
embedding for text documents is considered more challenging to
meet the aforementioned desiderata than its counterparts for im-
ages, videos, and audios [Agarwal 2013]. is is because the “pixel”
of a text document is individual leers, which, unlike an image
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pixel, cannot be changed into other leers without causing notice-
able dierences. Consequently, existing techniques have limited
information capacity or work only for specic digital le formats
(such as PDF or Microso Word).
We propose FontCode, a new information embedding technique
for text documents. Instead of changing text leers into dier-
ent ones, we alter the glyphs (i.e., the particular shape designs) of
their fonts to encode information, leveraging the recently developed
concept of font manifold [Campbell and Kautz 2014] in computer
graphics. ereby, the readability of the original document is fully
retained. We carefully choose the glyph perturbation such that it has
a minimal eect on the typeface appearance of the text document,
while ensuring that glyph perturbation can be recognized through
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). To recover the embedded
information, we develop a decoding algorithm that recovers the
information from an input encoded document—whether it is repre-
sented as a vector graphics le (such as a PDF) or a rasterized pixel
image (such as a photograph).
Exploiting the features specic to our message embedding and
retrieval problems, we further devise an error-correction coding
scheme that is able to fully recover embedded information up to a
certain number of recognition errors, making a smartphone into a
robust FontCode reader (see Fig. 1).
Applications. As a result, FontCode is not only an information
embedding technique for text documents but also an unobtrusive
tagging mechanism, nding a wide array of applications. We demon-
strate four of them. (i) It serves as a metadata holder in a text
document, which can be freely converted to dierent le formats
or printed on paper without loss of the metadata—across various
digital and physical forms, the metadata is always preserved. (ii)
It enables to embed in a text unobtrusive optical codes, ones that
can replace optical barcodes (such as QR codes) in artistic designs
such as posters and yers to minimize visual distraction caused by
the barcodes. (iii) By construction, it oers a basic cryptographic
scheme that not only embeds but also encrypts messages, without
resorting to any additional cryptosystem. And (iv) it oers a new
text signature mechanism, one that allows to verify document au-
thentication and integrity, regardless of its digital format or physical
form.
Technical contributions. We propose an algorithm to construct a
glyph codebook, a lookup table that maps a message into perturbed
glyphs and ensures the perturbation is unobtrusive to our eyes. We
then devise a recognition method that recovers the embedded mes-
sage from an encoded document. Both the codebook construction
and glyph recognition leverage CNNs. Additionally, we propose an
error-correction coding scheme that recties recognition errors due
to factors such as camera distortion. Built on a 1700-year old num-
ber theorem, the Chinese Remainder eorem, and a probabilistic
decoding model, our coding scheme is able to correct more errors
than what block codes based on Hamming distance can correct,
outperforming their theoretical error-correction upper bound.
2 RELATED WORK
We begin by clarifying a few typographic terminologies [Campbell
and Kautz 2014]: the typeface of a character refers to a set of fonts
each composed of glyphs that represent the specic design and
features of the character. With this terminology, our method embeds
messages by perturbing the glyphs of the fonts of text leers.
Font manipulation. While our method perturbs glyphs using the
generative model by Campbell and Kautz [2014], other methods
create fonts and glyphs with either computer-aided tools [Rugglcs
1983] or automatic generation. e early system by [Knuth 1986]
creates parametric fonts and was used to create most of the Com-
puter Modern typeface family. Later Shamir and Rappoport [1998]
proposed a system that generate fonts using high-level parametric
features and constraints to adjust glyphs. is idea was extended
to parameterize glyph shape components [Hu and Hersch 2001].
Other approaches generate fonts by deriving from examples and
templates [Lau 2009; Suveeranont and Igarashi 2010]. More recent
works have focused on structuring fonts based on similarity [Lovis-
cach 2010] or crowdsourced aributes [O’Donovan et al. 2014].
Font recognition. Automatic font recognition from a photo or
image has been studied [Avile´s-Cruz et al. 2005; Jung et al. 1999;
Ramanathan et al. 2009]. ese methods identify fonts by extracting
statistical and/or typographical features of the document. Recently
in [Chen et al. 2014], the authors proposed a scalable solution lever-
aging supervised learning. en, Wang et al. [2015] improved font
recognition using Convolutional Neural Networks. eir algorithm
can run without resorting to character segmentation and optical
character recognition methods. In our system, we use existing algo-
rithms to recognize text fonts of the input document, but further
devise an algorithm to recognize glyph perturbation for recovering
the embedded information. Unlike existing font recognition meth-
ods that identify fonts from a text of many leers, our algorithm
aims to identify glyph perturbation for individual leers.
Text steganography. Our work is related to digital steganography
(such as digital watermarks for copyright protection), which has
been studied for decades, mostly focusing on videos, images, and
audios. However, digital text steganography is much more challeng-
ing [Agarwal 2013], and thus much less developed. We categorize
existing methods based on their features (see Table 1):
Methods based on cover text generation (CTG) hide a secrete
message by generating an ad-hoc cover text which looks lexically
and syntactically convincing [Wayner 1992, 2009]. However, this
type of steganography is unable to embed messages in existing text
documents. us, they fail to meet the aribute that we call cover
text preservation (CP), and have limited applications.
e second type of methods exploits format-specic features
(FSF). For example, specically for Microso Word document, Bhaya
et al. [2013] assign each text character a dierent but visually similar
font available in Word to conceal messages. Others hide messages
by changing the character scale and color or adding underline styles
in a document [Panda et al. 2015; Stojanov et al. 2014], although
those changes are generally noticeable. More recent methods exploit
special ASCII codes and Unicodes that are displayed as an empty
space in a PDF viewer [Chaudhary et al. 2016; Rizzo et al. 2016].
ese methods are not format independent (FI); they are bounded
to a specic le format (such as Word or PDF) and text viewer. e
concealed messages would be lost if the document was converted
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Category Previous work AributeCP FGC FI PP
CTG [Agarwal 2013;
Wayner 2009]
X X X
SP
[Alaar and Alaar
2004; Brassil et al. 1995;
Gutub and Faani 2007;
Kim et al. 2003]
X X X
FSF
[Bhaya et al. 2013;
Chaudhary et al. 2016;
Panda et al. 2015; Rizzo
et al. 2016]
X X
Our work X X X X
Table 1. A summary of related text steganographic methods. CP indicates
cover text preservation; FGC indicates fine granularity coding; FI indicates
format-independent; PP indicates printed paper.
in a dierent format or even opened with a dierent version of the
same viewer. If also fails to preserve the concealed message when
the document is printed on paper (PP) and photographed later.
More relevant to our work is the family of methods that embed
messages via what we call structural perturbations (SP). Line-shi
methods [Alaar and Alaar 2004; Brassil et al. 1995] hide infor-
mation by perturbing the space between text lines: reducing or
increasing the space represents a 0 or 1 bit. Similarly, word-shi
methods [Brassil et al. 1995; Kim et al. 2003] perturb the spaces
between words. Others perturb the shape of specic characters,
such as raising or dropping the positions of the dots above “i” and
“j” [Brassil et al. 1995]. ese methods cannot support ne granular-
ity coding (FGC), in the sense that they encode 1 bit in every line
break, word break or special character that appears sparsely. Our
method provides ne granularity coding by embedding information
in individual leers, and thereby has a much larger information
capacity. In addition, all these methods demonstrate retrieval of
hidden messages from digital document les only. It is unclear to
what extent they can decode from real photos of text.
Table 1 summarizes these related work and their main aributes.
Like most of these work, our method aims to perturb the appearance
of the text in an unobtrusive, albeit not fully imperceptible, way. But
our method is advantageous by providing more desired aributes.
3 OVERVIEW
Our FontCode system embeds in a text document any type of infor-
mation as a bit string. For example, an arbitrary text message can be
coded into a bit string using the standard ASCII code or Unicode1.
We refer to such a bit string as a plain message.
In a text document, the basic elements of embedding a plain
message are the leers, appearing in a particular font. Our idea is
to perturb the glyph of each leer to embed a plain message. To
this end, we leverage the concept of font manifold proposed by
Campbell and Kautz [2014]. Taking as input a collection of existing
font les, their method creates a low-dimensional font manifold
1See the character set coding standards by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(hp://www.iana.org/assignments/character-sets/character-sets.xhtml)
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Fig. 2. Embedding and extraction. Here we sample 5 points around the
Times New Roman on the manifold (le), generating the perturbed glyphs
to embed integers (top-right). We embed “1” in leer “a” using the second
glyph (in orange) in the perturbation list. In the retrieval step, we evaluate
a probability value (inverse of distance) by our CNNs (boom-right), and
extract the integer whose glyph results in the highest probability.
for every character—including both alphabets and digits—such that
every location on this manifold generates a particular glyph of that
character. is novel generative model is precomputed once for
each character. en, it allows us to alter the glyph of each text
leer in a subtle yet systematic way, and thereby embed messages.
In this paper, when there is no confusion, we refer to a location
u on a font manifold and its resulting glyph interchangeably.
3.1 Message Embedding
Our message embedding method consists of two steps, (i) precompu-
tation of a codebook for processing all documents and (ii) runtime
embedding of a plain message in a given document.
During precomputation, we construct a codebook of perturbed
glyphs for typically used fonts. Consider a font such as Times New
Roman. Each character in this font corresponds to a specic location,
u¯, on the font manifold. We identify a set of locations on the man-
ifold as the perturbed glyphs of u¯ and denote them as {u0,u1, . . .}
(see Fig. 2). Our goal in this step is to select the perturbed glyphs
such that their dierences from the glyph u¯ of the original font is
almost unnoticeable to our naked eyes but recognizable to a com-
puter algorithm (detailed in §4). e sets of perturbed glyphs for all
characters with typically used fonts form our codebook.
At runtime, provided a text document (or a text region or para-
graphs), we perturb the glyph of the leer in the document to embed
a given plain message. Consider a leer in an original glyph u¯ in the
given document. Suppose in the precomputed codebook, this leer
has N perturbed glyphs, namely {u0,u1, . . . ,uN−1}. We embed in
the leer an integer i in the range of [0,N ) by changing its glyph
from u¯ to ui (see Fig. 2-top). A key algorithmic component of this
step is to determine the embedded integers for all leers such that
together they encode the plain message.
In addition, we propose a new error-correcting coding scheme
to encode the plain message. is coding scheme adds certain re-
dundancy (i.e., some extra data) to the coded message, which, at
decoding time, can be used to check for consistency of the coded
message and recover it from errors (see §5).
3.2 Message Retrieval
To retrieve information from a coded text document, the rst step
is to recover an integer from each leer. For each leer in the
document, suppose again this leer has N perturbed glyphs in the
codebook, whose manifold locations are {u0,u1, . . . ,uN−1}. We
recognize its glyph u ′ in the current document as one of the N
ACM Transactions on Graphics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
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Fig. 3. Overview. (le) Our embedding method takes an input message and a text document. It encodes the message into a series of integers and divides
the leers into blocks. The integers are assigned to each block and embedded in individual leers. (right) To recover the message, we extract integers by
recognizing the glyphs of individual leers. Then, the integers are decoded into the original plain message.
perturbed glyphs. We extract an integer i if u ′ is recognized as
ui (see Fig. 2-boom). Our recognition algorithm works with not
only vector graphics documents (such as those stored as PDFs) but
also rasterized documents stored as pixel images. For the laer, the
recognition leverages convolutional neural networks.
e retrieved integers are then fed into our error correction cod-
ing scheme to reconstruct the plain message. Because of the data
redundancy, even if some glyphs are mistakenly recognized (e.g.,
due to poor image quality), those errors will be rectied and we will
still be able to recover the message correctly (see §5).
4 GLYPH RECOGNITION
We start by focusing on our basic message embedding blocks: in-
dividual leers in a text document. Our goal in this section is to
embed an integer number in a single leer by perturbing its glyph,
and later retrieve that integer from a vector graphics or pixel image
of that leer. In the next section, we will address what integers to
assign to the leers in order to encode a message.
As introduced in §3.1, we embed an integer in a leer through
glyph perturbation, by looking up a precomputed codebook. Later,
when extracting an integer from a leer, we compute a “distance”
metric between the extracted glyph and each perturbed glyph in
{u0, . . . ,uN−1} in the codebook; we obtain integer i if the “distance”
of glyph ui is the smallest one.
Our recognition algorithm supports input documents stored as
vector graphics and pixel images. While it is straightforward to
recognize vector graphic glyphs, pixel images pose signicant chal-
lenges due to camera perspectives, rasterization noise, blurriness,
and so forth. In this section, we rst describe our algorithm that
decodes integers from rasterized (pixel) glyphs. is algorithm lever-
ages convolutional neural networks (CNNs), which also allow us to
systematically construct the codebook of perturbed glyphs. en,
we describe the details of embedding and extracting integers, as
well as a simple algorithm for recognizing vector graphic glyphs.
4.1 Pixel Image Preprocessing
When a text document is provided as a pixel image, we use the
o-the-shelf optical character recognition (OCR) library to detect
individual leers. Our approach does not depend on any particular
OCR library. In practice, we choose to use Tesseract [Smith 2007],
one of the most popular open source OCR engines. In addition to
detecting leers, OCR also identies a bounding box of every leer
on the pixel image.
To recognize the glyph perturbation of each leer using CNNs,
we rst preprocess the image. We crop the region of each leer
using its bounding box detected by the OCR. We then binarize the
image region using the classic algorithm by Otsu [1975]. is step
helps to eliminate the inuence caused by the variations of lighting
conditions and background colors. Lastly, we resize the image region
to have 200×200 pixels. is 200×200, black-and-white image for
each leer is the input to our CNNs (Fig. 4-le).
4.2 Network Structure
We treat glyph recognition as an image classication problem: pro-
vided an image region of a leer which has a list of perturbed glyphs
{u0,u1, . . .} in the codebook, our goal is to classify the input glyph
of that leer as one from the list. erefore, we train a CNN for
each leer in a particular font.
anks to the image preprocessing, we propose to use a simple
CNN structure (as illustrated in Fig. 4), which can be quickly trained
and evaluated. e input is a 200×200, black-and-white image con-
taining a leer. e CNN consists of three convolutional layers, each
followed by a ReLU activation layer (i.e., f : x ∈ R 7→ max(0,x))
and a 2×2 max pooling layer. e kernel size of the three convolu-
tional layers are 8×8×32, 5×5×64, and 3×3×32, respectively. e
convolutional layers are connected with two fully connected (FC)
layers, arranged in the following form (see Fig. 4):
→ FC(128) → Dropout→ FC(N ) → Somax→ output.
Here “Dropout” indicates a 0.5-dropout layer, and FC(m) is an m-
dimensional FC layer. In the second FC layer, N is the number of
perturbed glyphs in the codebook for the leer in a certain font. Af-
ter passing through a somax layer, the output is an N -dimensional
vector indicating the probabilities (or the inverse of “distance”) of
classifying the glyph of the input leer as one of the perturbed
glyphs in the list. e glyph of the leer is recognized as ui if its
corresponding probability in the output vector is the largest one.
4.3 Network Training
Training data. Our CNNs will be used for recognizing text doc-
ument images that are either directly synthesized or captured by
digital cameras. Correspondingly, the training data of the CNNs
consist of synthetic images and real photos. Consider a leer whose
perturbed glyphs from a standard font are {u0, . . . ,uN−1}. We print
all the N glyphs on a paper and take 10 photos with dierent light-
ing conditions and slightly dierent camera angle. While taking the
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Fig. 4. Network architecture. Our CNN takes as input a 200×200, black-and-white image containing a single leer (le). It consists 3 convolutional layers
(middle) and 2 fully connected layers (right). It outputs a vector, in which each element is the estimated probability of recognizing the glyph in the input
image as a perturbed glyph in the codebook.
photos, the camera is almost front facing the paper, mimicking the
scenarios of how the embedded information in a document would
be read by a camera. In addition, we include synthetic images by
rasterizing each glyph (whose vector graphics path is generated
using [Campbell and Kautz 2014]) into a 200×200 image.
Data augmentation. To train the CNNs, each training iteration
randomly draws a certain number of images from the training data.
We ensure that half of the images are synthetic and the other half
are from real photos. To reduce overing and improve the ro-
bustness, we augment the selected images before feeding them into
the training process. Each image is processed by the following
operations:
• Adding a small Gaussian noise with zero mean and standard
deviation 3.
• Applying a Gaussian blur whose standard deviation is uniformly
distributed between 0 (no blur) and 3px.
• Applying a randomly-parameterized perspective transformation.
• Adding a constant border with a width randomly chosen between
0 and 30px.
We note that similar data augmentations have been used in [Chen
et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2015] to enrich their training data. Lastly,
we apply the preprocessing routine described in §4.1, obtaining a
binary image whose pixel values are either 0 or 1.
Implementation details. In practice, our CNNs are optimized using
the Adam algorithm [Kingma and Ba 2015] with the parameters
β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and a mini-batch size of 15. e network was
trained with 105 update iterations at a learning rate of 10−3. Our
implementation also leverages existing libraries, Tensorow [Abadi
et al. 2015] and Keras [Chollet et al. 2015].
4.4 Constructing The Glyph Codebook
e CNNs not only help to recognize glyphs at runtime, but also
enable us to systematically construct the glyph codebook, a lookup
table that includes a set of perturbed glyphs for every character in
commonly used fonts (such as Times New Roman, Helvetica, and
Calibri). Our codebook construction aims to satisfy three criteria: (i)
e included glyph perturbation must be perceptually similar; their
dierences from the original fonts should be hardly noticeable to our
eyes. (ii) e CNNs must be able to distinguish the perturbed glyphs
reliably. (iii) Meanwhile, we wish to include as many perturbed
glyphs as possible in the codebook for each character, in order to
increase the capacity of embedding information (see §5).
To illustrate our algorithm, consider a single character in a given
font. We use its location u¯ on the character’s font manifold to refer
to the original glyph of the font. Our construction algorithm rst
nds a large set of glyph candidates that are perceptually similar
to u¯. is step uses crowdsourced perceptual studies following a
standard user-study protocol. We therefore defer its details until
§6, while in this section we denote the resulting set of glyphs as C,
which typically has hundreds of glyphs. Next, we reduce the size of
C by discarding glyphs that may confuse our CNNs in recognition
tests. is is an iterative process, wherein each iteration takes the
following two steps (see Algorithm 1 in Appendix):
Confusion test. We randomly select M pairs of glyphs in C
(M =100 in practice). For each pair, we check if our CNN structure
(introduced in §4.2) can reliably distinguish the two glyphs. In this
case, we consider only the two glyphs, and thus the last FC layer
(recall §4.2) has two dimensions. We train this network with only
synthetic images processed by the data augmentations. We use
synthetic images generated by dierent augmentations to test the
accuracy of the resulting CNN. If the accuracy is less than 95%, then
we record this pair of glyphs in a set D.
Updating glyph candidate set. Next, we update the glyph can-
didates in C to avoid the recorded glyph pairs that may confuse the
CNNs while retaining as many glyph candidates as possible in C.
To this end, we construct a graph where every node i represents
a glyph in C. Initially, this graph is completely connected. en,
the edge between node i and j is removed if the glyph pair i j is
listed in D, meaning that i and j are hardly distinguishable by our
CNN. With this graph, we nd the maximum set of glyph that can
be distinguished from each other. is amounts to the classic max-
imum clique problem on graphs. Although the maximum clique
problem has been proven NP-hard (see page 97 of [Karp 1972]), our
graph size is small (with up to 200 nodes), and the edges are sparse.
Consequently, many existing algorithms suce to nd the maxi-
mum clique eciently. In practice, we choose to use the method
of [Konc and Janezic 2007]. Lastly, the glyphs corresponding to the
maximum clique nodes form the updated glyph candidate set C, and
we move on to the next iteration.
is iterative process stops when there is no change of C. In our
experiments, this takes up to 5 iterations. Because only synthetic
images are used as training data, this process is fully automatic and
fast, but it narrows down the glyph candidates conservatively—two
glyphs in C might still be hardly distinguishable in real photos.
erefore, in a last step, we train a CNN as described in §4.3 using
both synthetic images and real photos to verify if the CNN can
ACM Transactions on Graphics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
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Fig. 5. A fragment of codebook. A complete codebook for all alphabetic
characters in lower case for Times New Roman can be found in the supple-
mental document.
reliably recognize all glyphs in C. Here the last FC layer of CNN
has a dimension of |C| (i.e., the size of C). At this point, |C| is
small (typically around 25). us, the CNN can be easily trained.
Aerwards, we evaluate the recognition accuracy of the CNN for
each glyph in C, and discard the glyphs whose recognition accuracy
is below 90%. e remaining glyphs in C are added to the codebook
as the perturbed glyphs of the character.
4.5 Embedding and Retrieving Integers
Embedding. Now we can embed integers into a text document
in either vector graphic or pixel image format. First, we extract
from the input document the text content and the layout of the
leers. Our method also needs to know the original font u¯ of the
text. is can be specied by the user or automatically obtained
from the metadata of a vector graphic document (such as a PDF). If
the document is provided as a pixel image, recent methods [Chen
et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2015] can be used to recognize the text font.
In order to embed an integer i in a leer of font u¯, we look up its
perturbed glyph list {u0, . . . ,uN−1} in the precomputed codebook,
and generate the leer shaped by the glyphui [Campbell and Kautz
2014]. We then scale the glyph to t it into the bounding box of the
original leer (which is detected by the OCR library for pixel images),
and use it to replace the original leer of the input document.
Retrieval. To retrieve integers from a pixel image, we extract the
text content and identify regions of individual leers using the OCR
tool. Aer we crop the regions of the leers, they are processed
in parallel by the recognition algorithm: they are preprocessed
as described in §4.1 and then fed into the CNNs. An integer i is
extracted from a leer if the output vector from its CNN has the
i-th element as the largest (recall §4.2).
If the input document is provided as a vector graphics image (e.g.,
as a PDF le), glyph recognition of a leer is straightforward. In our
codebook, we store the outlines of the perturbed glyphs as polylines.
In the integer embedding stage, these polylines are scaled to replace
the paths of the original glyphs. In the retrieval stage, we compute
the “distance” between the leer’s glyph polyline, denoted as f , in
the document and every glyph ui in the perturbed glyph list of the
codebook: we rst scale the polylines of ui to match the bounding
box of f , and then compute the L2 distance between the polyline
vertices of ui and f . We recognize f as uj (and thus extract the
integer j) if the distance between f and uj is the minimum.
5 ERROR CORRECTION CODING
Aer presenting the embedding and retrieval of integer values over
individual leers, we now focus on a plain message represented as
a bit string and describe our coding scheme that encodes the bit
string into a series of integers, which will be in turn embedded in
individual leers. We also introduce an error-correction decoding
algorithm that decodes the bit string from a series of integers, even
when some integers are incorrect.
Algorithms presented in this section are built on the coding theory
for noise channels, founded by Shannon’s landmark work [Shan-
non 1948]. We refer the reader to the textbook [Lin and Costello
2004] for a comprehensive introduction. Here, we start with a brief
introduction of traditional error-correcting codes, to point out their
fundamental dierences from our coding problem.
5.1 Challenges of the Coding Problem
e most common error-correction coding scheme is block coding, in
which an information sequence is divided into blocks of k symbols
each. We denote a block using a k-tuple, r = (r1, r2, ..., rk ). For
example, a 128-bit binary string can be divided into 16 blocks of 8-bit
binary strings. In this case, k = 8, and ri is either 0 or 1. In general,
ri can vary in other ranges of discrete symbols. A fundamental
requirement of error-correction coding is that (i) the number of
possible symbols for each ri must be the same, and (ii) this number
must be a prime power pm , where p is a prime number andm is a
positive integer. In abstract algebraic language, it requires the blocks
to be in a Galois Field, GF(pm ). For example, the aforementioned
8-bit strings are in GF(2). Most of the current error-correction
coding schemes (e.g., Reed-Solomon codes [Reed and Solomon
1960]) are built on the algebraic operations in the polynomial ring
of GF(pm ). At encoding time, they transform k-tuple blocks into
n-tuple blocks in the same Galois eld GF(pm ), where n is larger
than k . At decoding time, some symbols in the n-tuple blocks can
be incorrect. But as long as the total number of incorrect symbols
in a block is no more than
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
regardless of the locations of
incorrections, the coding scheme can fully recover the original k-
tuple block.
In our problem, a text document consists of a sequence of leers.
At rst glance, we can divide the leer sequence into blocks of k
leers each. Unfortunately, these blocks are ill-suited for traditional
block coding schemes. For example, consider a ve-leer block,
(C1,C2, ...,C5), with an original font u¯. Every leer has a dierent
capacity for embedding integers: in the codebook, Ci has si glyphs,
so it can embed integers in the range [0, si ). However, in order to
use block coding, we need to nd a prime power pm that is no more
than any si , i = 1...5 (to construct a Galois eld GF(pm )). en every
leer can only embedpm integers, which can be signicantly smaller
than si . Perhaps a seemingly beer approach is to nd ti =
⌊
log2 si
⌋
for every si , and use the 5-leer block to represent a T -bit binary
string, whereT =
∑5
i=1 ti . In this case, this binary string is in GF(2),
valid for block coding. Still, this approach wastes much of the leers’
embedding capacity. For example, if a leer has 30 perturbed glyphs,
this approach can only embed integers in [0, 16). As experimentally
shown in §8.2, it signicantly reduces the amount of information
that can be embedded. In addition, traditional block coding method
is oen concerned with a noisy communication channel, where an
error occurs at individual bits. In contrast, our recognition error
occurs at individual leers. When the glyph of a leer is mistakenly
recognized, a chunk of bits becomes incorrect, and the number of
ACM Transactions on Graphics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
FontCode: Embedding Information in Text Documents using Glyph Perturbation • 1:7
Fig. 6. Analogy of Euclidean distance on 2D plane to gain intuition of
Theorem 5.2. Here r0 and r1 represent two codewords having the minimum
Hamming distance Hm . Suppose r0 is recognized as a code vector r . If the
distance |r − r0 | < Hm/2 (e.g., ra ), it is safe to decode r into r0, as no
other codeword is closer to r . If |r − r0 | > Hm/2, there might be multiple
codewords having the same distance to r (e.g., when r is rb ), and r may
be mistakenly decoded as r1 (e.g., when r is rc ).
incorrect bits depends on specic leers. us, it is harder to set
a proper relative redundancy (i.e., (n − k)/n in block coding) to
guarantee successful error correction.
5.2 Chinese Reminder Codes
To address these challenges, we introduce a new coding scheme
based on a 1700-year old number theorem, the Chinese remainder
theorem (CRT) [Katz and Imhausen 2007]. Error-correction coding
based on Chinese remainder theorem has been studied in the eld of
theoretical computing [Boneh 2000; Goldreich et al. 1999], known as
the Chinese Remainder Codes (CRC). Building on CRC, we propose
a coding scheme oering improved error-correction ability (§5.3).
We start our presentation by dening our coding problem formally.
Problem denition. Given a text document, we divide its leer
sequence into blocks of n leers each. Consider a block, denoted
as C = (C1,C2, ...,Cn ) in an original font u¯. Our goal for now is to
embed an integerm in this n-leer block, wherem is in the range
[0,M). We will map the plain message into a series of integers later
in this section. Formally, we seek an encoding function ϕ : m → r ,
wherer = (r1, ..., rn ) is ann-vector of integers. Following the coding
theory terminology, we refer r as a codeword. e function ϕ needs
to ensure that every ri can be embedded in the leerCi . Meanwhile,
ϕ must be injective, so r can be uniquely mapped to m through a
decoding function ϕ+ : r →m. Additionally, the computation of ϕ
and ϕ+ must be fast, to encode and decode in a timely fashion.
5.2.1 Hamming Distance Decoding. We now introduce Hamming
Distance decoding, a general decoding framework for block codes,
to pave the way for our coding scheme.
Denition 5.1 (Hamming Distance). Given two codewords u and
v , the Hamming DistanceH (u,v)measures the number of pair-wise
elements in which they dier.
For example, given two codewords, u = (2, 3, 1, 0, 6) and v =
(2, 0, 1, 0, 7), H (u,v) = 2.
Now we consider glyph recognition errors. If the integer retrieval
from a leer’s glyph is incorrect, then the input r˜ of the decoding
function ϕ+ may not be a valid codeword. In other words, because
of the recognition errors, it is possible that nom satises ϕ(m) = r˜ .
To distinguish from a codeword, we refer to r˜ as a code vector.
e Hamming distance decoding uses a decoding function ϕ+
based on the Hamming distance: ϕ+(r˜ ) returns an integerm such
that the Hamming distance H (ϕ(m), r˜ ) is minimized over all m ∈
[0,M). Intuitively, although r˜ may not be a valid codeword, we
decode it as the integer whose codeword is closest to r˜ under the
measure of Hamming distance. Let Hm denote the minimum Ham-
ming distance among all pairs of valid codewords, namely,
Hm = min
i, j ∈[0,M−1]
i,j
H (ϕ(i),ϕ(j)).
e error-correction ability of Hamming distance decoding is bounded
by the following theorem [Lin and Costello 2004],
Theorem 5.2. Let E denote the number of incorrect symbols in a
code vector r˜ . en, the Hamming distance decoding can correctly
recover the integerm if E ≤
⌊
Hm−1
2
⌋
; it can detect errors in r¯ but not
recover the integer correctly if
⌊
Hm−1
2
⌋
< E < Hm .
An illustrative understanding of this theorem using an analogy of
Euclidean distance is shown in Fig. 6. is theorem holds regardless
of the encoding function ϕ, as long as it is a valid injective function.
5.2.2 Chinese Reminder Codes. We now introduce the following
version of the Chinese Reminder eorem, whose proof can be
found in [Rosen 2011].
Theorem 5.3 (Chinese Remainder Theorem). Let p1,p2, ...pk
denote positive integers which are mutually prime andM =
∏k
i=1 pi .
en, there exists an injective function,
ϕ : [0,M) → [0,p1) × [0,p2) × ...[0,pk ),
dened as ϕ(m) = (r1, r2, ..., rn ), such that for allm ∈ [0,M), ri =
m mod pi .
is theorem indicates that given k pairs of integers (ri ,pi ) with
all pi being mutually prime, there exists a unique non-negative
integer m <
∏k
i=1 pi satisfying ri = m mod pi for all i = 1...k .
Indeed,m can be computed using the formula,
m = CRT (r ,p) = r1b1 P
p1
+ ... + rnbn
P
pn
, (1)
where P =
∏k
i=1 pi , and bi is computed by solving a system of
modular equations,
bi
P
pi
≡ 1 (mod pi ), i = 1...k,
using the classic Euclidean algorithm [Rosen 2011].
If we extend the list of pi to n mutually prime numbers (n > k)
such that the n − k additional numbers are all larger than pi up to
i = k (i.e., pj > pi for any j = k+1...n and i = 1...k), then we have
an encoding function ϕ for non-negative integerm <
∏k
i=1 pi :
ϕ(m) = (m mod p1,m mod p2, ...,m mod pn ). (2)
is encoding function already adds redundancy: because m is
smaller than the product of any k numbers chosen from pi , we can
compute m from any k of the n pairs of (ri ,pi ), according to the
Chinese Reminder eorem. Indeed, as proved in [Goldreich et al.
1999], the minimum Hamming distance of the encoding function (2)
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Fig. 7. An example of determiningmt : (top) The bit string representation
of the plain message; (boom) Each block of leers is highlighted by a color;
(middle)mt values assigned to each block.
for all 0 ≤ m < ∏ki=1 pi is n − k + 1. us, the Hamming decoding
function of ϕ can correct up to
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
errors by eorem 5.2.
Encoding. We now describe our encoding algorithm based on the
encoding function ϕ(m) in (2).
• Computing pi . Suppose that the leer sequence of a document
has been divided into N blocks, denoted as C1, ...,CN , each with
n leers. Consider a block Ct = (C1, ...,Cn ), whereCi indicates a
leer with its original fontui , whose integer embedding capacity
is si (i.e., Ci ’s font ui has si perturbed glyphs in the codebook).
We depth-rst search n mutually prime numbers pi , i = 1...n,
such that pi ≤ si and the product of k minimal pi is maximized.
At the end, we obtain pi , i = 1...n and the product of k minimal
pi denoted as Mt for each block Ct . Note that if we could not
nd mutually prime numbers pi for block Ct , we simply ignore
the leer whose embedding capacity is smallest among all si and
include Cn+1 to this block. We repeat this process until we nd
a valid set of mutually prime numbers.
• Determiningmt . Given the plain message represented as a bit
string M, we now split the bits into a sequence of chunks, each
of which is converted into an integer and assigned to a block Ct .
We assign to each block Ct an integer mt with
⌊
log2 Mt
⌋
bits,
which is sequentially cut from the bit string M (see Fig. 7).
• Embedding. For every block Ct , we compute the codeword
using the CRT encoding function (2), obtaining r = (r1, ..., rn ).
Each ri is then embedded in the glyph of the leerCi in the block
Ct as described in §4.5.
Decoding. At decoding time, we recognize the glyphs of the leers
in a document and extract integers from them, as detailed in §4.5.
Next, we divide the leer sequence into blocks, and repeat the
algorithm of computing pi and Mt as in the encoding step, for every
block. Given a block Ct , the extracted integers from its leers form
a code vector r˜t = (r˜1, ..., r˜n ). We refer to it as a code vector because
some of the r˜i may be incorrectly recognized. To decode r˜t , we
rst compute m˜t = CRT (r˜t ,pt ) where pt stacks all pi in the block.
If m˜t < Mt , then m˜t is the decoding result ϕ+(r˜t ), because the
Hamming distance H (ϕ(m˜t ), r˜ ) = 0. Otherwise, we decode r˜t using
the Hamming decoding function: concretely, since we know the
current block can encode an integer in the range [0,Mt ), we decode
r˜t into the integermt by nding
mt = ϕ
+(r˜ ) = arg min
m∈[0,Mt )
H (ϕ(m), r˜ ). (3)
As discussed above, this decoding function can correct up to
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
incorrectly recognized glyphs in each block. Lastly, we convertmt
into a bit string and concatenatemt from all blocks sequentially to
recover the plain message.
Implementation details. A few implementation details are worth
noting. First, oentimes leers in a document can carry a bit string
much longer than the given plain message. To indicate the end of
the message, we aach a special chunk of bits (end-of-message bits)
at the end of each plain message, very much akin to the end-of-line
(newline) character used in digital text systems. Second, in practice,
blocks should be relatively short (i.e., n is small). If n is large, it
becomes much harder to nd n mutually prime numbers that are no
more than each leer’s embedding capacity. In practice, we choose
n = 5 and k = 3 which allows one mistaken leer in every 5-leer
block. e small n and k also enable brute-force search ofmt in (3)
suciently fast, although there also exists a method solving (3) in
polynomial time [Boneh 2000; Goldreich et al. 1999].
5.3 Improved Error Correction Capability
Using the Chinese Remainder Codes, the error-correction capacity
is upper bounded. eorem 5.2 indicates that at most
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
mistak-
enly recognized glyphs are allowed in every leer block. We now
break this theoretical upper bound to further improve our error-
correction ability, by exploiting specic properties of our coding
problem. To this end, we propose a new algorithm based on the
maximum likelihood decoding [Lin and Costello 2004].
In coding theory, maximum likelihood decoding is not an algo-
rithm. Rather, it is a decoding philosophy, a framework that models
the decoding process from a probabilistic rather than an algebraic
point of view. Consider a leer blockC and the code vector r˜ formed
by the extracted integers from C. We treat the true codeword r en-
coded by C as a latent variable (in statistic language), and model the
probability of r given the extracted code vector r˜ , namely P(r |r˜ ).
With this likelihood model, our decoding process nds a codeword r
that maximizes the probability P(r |r˜ ), and decodes r into an integer
using the Chinese Remainder eorem formula (1).
When there are at most
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
errors in a block, the Hamming
decoding function (3) is able to decode. In fact, it can be proved
that when the number of errors is under this bound, there exists
a uniquem ∈ [0,Mt ) that minimizes H (ϕ(m), r˜ ) [Lin and Costello
2004], and that when the number of errors becomes
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
+1, there
may be multiplem ∈ [0,Mt ] reaching the minimum (see Fig. 6 for
an intuitive explanation). e key idea of breaking this bound is to
use a likelihood model to choose anm when ambiguity occurs for
the Hamming decoding function (3).
Code Vector 2    3   1    7   6
Codeword 1 2    3   4
    
5   6
Codeword 2 4    3   5 7   6
Consider a block with
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
+
1 errors, and suppose in (3) we
nd Nc dierent integers mi ,
all of which lead to the same
minimal Hamming distance to
the code vector r˜ . Let ri =
ϕ(mi ), i = 1...Nc , denote the cor-
responding codewords. We use
another subscript j to index the
integer elements in code vectors and codewords. For every ri , some
of its integer elements ri j diers from the corresponding integer
elements r˜ j . Here ri j can be interpreted as the index of the per-
turbed glyphs of the j-th leer. We denote this glyph as ui j and the
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Fig. 8. MTurk result. (le) The fontmanifold of the leer “a” color-mapped
using the perceptual similarity value of each point to the standard Time
New Roman font. (right) Sampled glyphs that correspond to the manifold
locations indicated by red circles. The colors indicate their perceptual
similarity to the Times New Roman.
leer’s glyph extracted from the input image as f . If ri j is indeed
the embedded integer, then f is mistakenly recognized, resulting in
a dierent glyph number r˜ j .
We rst model the probability of this occurrence, denoted as
P(r˜ j |ri j ), using our “distance” metric. Intuitively, the closer the two
glyphs are, the more likely one is mistakenly recognized as the other.
en the probability of recognizing a codeword ri as a code vector
r˜ accounts for all inconsistent element pairs in ri and r˜ , namely,
P(r˜ |ri ) =
∏
j,ri j,r˜ j
д(ui j , f )∑sj
k=1 д(u¯kj , f )
. (4)
Here д(·, ·) is (inversely) related to our distance metric between two
glyphs: for pixel images, д(ui j , f ) is the probability of recognizing
f asui j , which is the ri j -th somax output from the CNN of the i-th
leer, given the input glyph image f (recall §4.2); for vector graphics,
д(ui j , f ) = 1/d(ui j , f ), the inverse of the vector graphic glyph
distance (dened in §4.5). e denominator is for normalization,
where u¯kj iterates through all perturbed glyphs of the j-th leer
in the codebook. For pixel images, the denominator is always 1
because of the unitary property of the somax function. Lastly,
the likelihood P(ri |r˜ ) needed for decoding is computed by Bayes
eorem,
P(ri |r˜ ) = P(r˜ |ri )P(ri )
P(r˜ ) . (5)
Here, P(r˜ ) is xed, and so is P(ri ) as all codewords are equally likely
to be used. As a result, we nd ri that maximizes (5) among all Nc
ambiguous codewords, and decode r˜ using ri .
In our experiments (§8.3), we show that the proposed decoding
scheme indeed improves the error-correction ability. For our im-
plementation wherein n = 5 and k = 3, in each block we are able
to correct up to 2 errors, as opposed to 1 indicated by eorem 5.2,
thereby increasing the error tolerance from 20% to 40%.
6 PERCEPTUAL EVALUTATION
We now describe our crowd-sourced perceptual studies on Mechan-
ical Turk (MTurk). e goal of the studies is, for each character in a
particular font, to nd a set of glyphs that are perceptually similar
to its original glyph u¯. When constructing the glyph codebook, we
use these sets of glyphs to initialize the candidates of perturbed
glyphs (recall §4.4).
e user studies adopt a well-established protocol: we present
the MTurk raters multiple questions, and each question uses a two-
alternative forced choice (2AFC) scheme, i.e., the MTurk raters must
choose one from two options. We model the rater’s response us-
ing a logistic function (known as the Bradley-Terry model [1952]),
which allows us to learn a perceptual metric (in this case the per-
ceptual similarity of glyphs) from the raters’ response. We note that
this protocol has been used previously in other perceptual studies
(e.g., [O’Donovan et al. 2014; Um et al. 2017]), and that we will later
refer back to this protocol in §8.3 when we evaluate the perceptual
quality of our results. Next, we describe the details of the studies.
Setup. We rst choose on the font manifold a large region centered
at u¯, and sample locations densely in this region. In practice, all
font manifolds are in 2D, and we choose 400 locations uniformly
in a squared region centered at u¯. Let F denote the set of glyphs
corresponding to the sampled manifold locations. en, in each
MTurk question, we present the rater a pair of glyphs randomly
selected from F , and ask which one of the two glyphs looks closer to
the glyph of the original font u¯. An example is shown in Fig. 9. We
assign 20 questions to each MTurk rater. Four of them are control
questions, which are designed to detect untrustworthy raters. e
four questions ask the rater to compare the same pair of glyphs
presented in dierent order. We reject raters whose answers have
more than one inconsistencies among the control questions. At the
end, about 200 raters participated the studies for each character.
Instructions:
Your task is to select the most similar font pair from
the two pairs of font images. 
The two images on the left column are always
identifcal fonts. 
Question1
Fig. 9. MTurk user interface.
Analysis. From the raters’ response, we estimate a scalar value
si = s(ui ; u¯), the perceptual similarity value of the glyph ui to
the original glyph u¯, for every glyph ui ∈ F . Let a set of tuples
D = {(ui ,uj ,u,q)} record the user study responses, where ui and
uj are randomly selected glyphs being compared, u is the MTurk
rater’s ID, and the binary valueq is the rater’s choice: q = 1 indicates
the rater judgesui perceptually closer to u¯, and q = 0 otherwise. We
model the likelihood of the rater’s choice using a logistic function,
p(q = 1|ui ,uj ,u) = 11 + exp (ru (si − sj )) , (6)
where the scalar ru indicates the rater’s reliability. With this model,
all the similarity values si and user reliability values ru are obtained
by minimizing a negative log-likelihood objective function,
E(s,r ) = −
∑
k
[
qk lnp(q = 1|uki ,ukj ,uk ) +
(1 − qk ) lnp(q = 0|uki ,ukj ,uk )
]
,
where k indices the MTurk response in D, r stacks the raters’ relia-
bility values, and s stacks the similarity values for all ui ∈ F . e
si values are then normalized in the range of [0, 1].
We learn the similarity values for the glyphs of every character
with a font u¯ independently. Fig. 8 visualizes the perceptual similar-
ity of glyphs near the standard Times New Roman for the character
“a”. Lastly, We iterate through all the pre-sampled glyphs ui ∈ F ,
and add those whose similarity value si is larger than a threshold
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(0.85 in practice) into a set C, forming the set of perceptually similar
glyphs for constructing the codebook (in §4.4).
7 APPLICATIONS
Our method nds many applications. In this section, we discuss
four of them, while referring to the supplemental video for their
demonstrations and to §8.1 for implementation summaries.
7.1 Application I: Format-Independent Metadata
Many digital productions carry metadata that provide additional
information, resources, and digital identication [Greenberg 2005].
Perhaps most well-known is the metadata embedded in photographs,
providing information such as camera parameters and copyright.
PDF les can also contain metadata2. In fact, metadata has been
widely used by numerous tools to edit and organize digital les.
Currently, the storage of metadata is ad hoc, depending on specic
le format. For instance, a JPEG image stores metadata in its EXIF
header, while an Adobe PDF stores its metadata in XML format with
Adobe’s XMP framework [Adobe 2001]. Consequently, metadata
is lost whenever one converts an image from JPEG to PNG format,
or rasterizes a vector graphics image into a pixel image. Although
it is possible to develop a careful converter that painstakingly pre-
serves the metadata across all le formats, the metadata is still lost
whenever the image or document is printed on paper.
Our FontCode technique can serve as a means to host text doc-
ument metadata. More remarkably, the metadata storage in our
technique is format-independent, because format conversion and
rasterization of text documents, as well as printing on paper, all
preserve the glyphs of leers. Once information is embedded in
a document, one can freely convert it to a dierent le format, or
rasterize it into a pixel image (as long as the image is not severely
downsampled), or print it on a piece of paper. roughout, the
metadata is retained (see video).
7.2 Application II: Imperceptible Optical Codes
Our FontCode technique can also be used as optical barcodes embed-
ded in a text document, akin to QR codes [Denso 2011]. Barcodes
have numerous applications in advertising, sales, inventory track-
ing, robotics, augmented reality, and so forth. Similar to QR codes
that embed certain level of redundancy to correct decoding error,
FontCode also supports error-correction decoding. However, all
existing barcodes require to print black-and-white blocks and bars,
which can be visually distracting and aesthetically imperfect. Our
technique, in contrast, enables not only an optical code but an unob-
trusive optical code, as it only introduces subtle changes to the text
appearance. Our retrieval algorithm is suciently fast to provide
point-and-shoot kind of message decoding. It can be particularly
suitable for use as a replacement of QR codes in an artistic work
such as a poster or yer design, where visual distraction needs to be
minimized. As a demonstration, we have implemented an iPhone
application to read coded text (see video).
2If you are reading this paper with Adobe Acrobat Reader, you can view its meta-
data by choosing “File→Properties” and clicking the “Additional Metadata” under the
“Description” tab.
7.3 Application III: Encrypted Message Embedding
Our technique can further encrypt a message when embedding it in
a document, even if the entire embedding and retrieval algorithms
are made public. Recall that when embedding an integer i in a
leer c of a glyph u¯, we replace u¯ with a glyph chosen from a list of
perturbed glyphs in the codebook. Let Lc = {u0, . . . ,uNc−1} denote
this list. Even though the perturbed glyphs for every character in a
particular font are precomputed, the order of the glyphs in each list
Lc can be arbitrarily user-specied. e particular orders of all Lc
together can serve as an encryption key.
For example, when Alice and Bob3 communicate through encoded
documents, they can use a publicly available codebook, but agree
on a private key, which species the glyph permutation of each
list Lc . If an original list {u0,u1,u2, . . .} of a leer is permuted
into {up0 ,up1 ,up2 , . . .} by the key, then Alice uses the glyph upi ,
rather thanui , to embed an integer i in the leer, and Bob deciphers
the message using the same permuted codebook. For a codebook
that we precomputed for Times New Roman (see the supplemental
document), if we only consider lowercase English alphabet, there
exist 1.39 × 10252 dierent keys (which amount to a 837-bit key); if
we also include uppercase English alphabet, there exist 5.73 × 10442
keys (which amount to a 1470-bit key). us, without resorting to
any existing cryptographic algorithm, our method already oers a
basic encryption scheme. Even if others can carefully examine the
text glyphs and discover that a document is indeed embedding a
message, the message can still be protected from leaking.
7.4 Application IV: Text Document Signature
Leveraging existing cryptographic techniques, we augment Font-
Code to propose a new digital signature technique, one that can
authenticate the source of a text document and guarantee its in-
tegrity (thereby protecting from tampering). is technique has two
variations, working as follows:
Scheme 1. When Alice creates a digital document, she maps the
document content (e.g., including leers, digits, and punctuation)
into a bit string through a cryptographic hash function such as
the MD5 [Rivest 1992] and SHA [Eastlake and Jones 2001]. We
call this bit string the document’s hash string. Alice then chooses
a private key to permute the codebook as described in §7.3, and
uses the permuted codebook to embed the hash string into her
document. When Bob tries to tamper this document, any change
leads to a dierent hash string. Without knowing Alice’s private
key, he cannot embed the new hash string in the document, and
thus cannot tamper the document successfully. Later, Alice can
check the integrity of her document, by extracting the embedded
hash string and comparing it against the hash string of the current
document.
Scheme 2. e above algorithm allows only Alice to check the
integrity of her document, as only she knows her private key. By
combining with asymmetric cryptography such as the RSA algo-
rithm [Rivest et al. 1978], we allow everyone to check the integrity
of a document but not to tamper it. Now, the codebook is public but
3Here we follow the convention in cryptography, using Alice and Bob as placeholder
names for the convenience of presenting algorithms.
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not permuted. Aer Alice generates the hash string of her document,
she encrypts the hash string using her private key by an asymmetric
cryptosystem, and obtains an encrypted string. en, she embeds
the encrypted string in the document using the FontCode method,
while making her public key available to everyone. In this case, Bob
cannot tamper the document, as he does not have Alice’s private
key to encrypt the hash string of an altered document. But everyone
in the world can extract the encrypted string using the FontCode
method, and decipher the hash string using Alice’s public key. If
the deciphered hash string matches the hash string of the current
document, it proves that (i) the document is indeed sourced from
Alice, and (ii) the document has not been modied by others.
Advantages. In comparison to existing digital signatures such as
those in Adobe PDFs, our method is format-independent. In contrast
to PDF les whose signatures are lost when the les are rasterized
or printed on physical papers, our FontCode signature is preserved
regardless of le format conversion, rasterization, and physical
printing.
Further extension. In digital text forensics, it is oen desired to
not only detect tampering but also locate where in the text the tam-
pering occurs. In this regard, our method can be extended for more
detailed tampering detection. As shown in our analysis (§8.2), in a
typical English document, we only need about 80 leers to embed
(with error correction) a string of 128 bits, which is the length of a
hash string resulted from a typical cryptographic hash function (e.g.,
MD5). Given a document, we divide its text into a set of segments,
each with at least 80 leers. We then compute a hash string for each
segment and embed the encrypted strings in individual segments.
is creates a ne granularity of text signatures, allowing the user
to check which text segment is modied, and thereby locating tam-
pering occurrences more precisely. For example, in the current text
format of this paper, every two-column line consists of around 100
leers, meaning that our method can identify tampering locations
up to two-column lines in this paper. To our knowledge, digital text
protection with such a ne granularity has not been realized.
Discussion about the storage. We close this section with a remark
on the memory footprint of our steganographic documents. If a
document is stored as a pixel image, then it consumes no additional
memory. If it is in vector graphics format, our current implementa-
tion stores the glyph contour polylines of all leers. A document
with 376 leers with 639 bits encoded will consume 1.2M memory in
a compressed SVG form and 371K in a compressed JPEG format. PDF
les can embed glyph shapes in the le and refer to those glyphs
in the text. Using this feature, we can also embed the entire code-
book in a PDF, introducing about 1.3M storage overhead, regardless
of the text length. In the future, if all glyphs in the codebook are
pre-installed on the operating system, like the current standardized
fonts, the memory footprint of vector graphic documents can be
further reduced.
8 RESULTS AND VALIDATION
We now present the results and experiments to analyze the perfor-
mance of our technique and validate our algorithmic choices. Here
we consider text documents with English alphabet, including both
Fig. 10. (top) an input text document. (bottom) the output document that
embeds a randomly generated message.
lower- and upper-case leers, while the exact method can be directly
applied to digits and other special characters. We rst present our
main results (§8.1), followed by the numerical (§8.2) and perceptual
(§8.3) evaluation of our method.
8.1 Main Results
We implemented the core coding scheme on a Intel Xeon E5-1620
8 core 3.60GHz CPU with 32GB of memory. e CNNs are trained
with an NVidia Geforce TITAN X GPU. Please see our accompanying
video for the main results. A side-by-side comparison of an original
document with a coded document is shown in Fig. 10.
Metadata viewer. We implemented a simple text document viewer
that loads a coded document in vector graphics or pixel image
format. e viewer displays the document. Meanwhile, it extracts
the embedded metadata with our decoding algorithm and presents
it in a side panel.
Unobtrusive optical codes. We also implemented an iPhone appli-
cation (see Fig. 1), by which the user can take a photo of an encoded
text displayed on a computer screen or printed on paper. e iPhone
application interface allows the user to select a text region to cap-
ture. e captured image is sent through the network to a decoding
server, which recovers the embedded message and sends it back to
the smartphone.
Embedding encrypted message. Our implementation allows the
user to load an encryption key le that species the permutation for
all the lists of perturbed glyphs in the codebook. e permutation
can be manually edited, or randomly generated—given a glyph
list of length n, one can randomly sample a permutation from the
permutation group Sn [Seress 2003] and aach it to the key.
Text document signature. We use our technique to generate a MD5
signature as described in §7. Since the MD5 checksum has only 128
bits, we always embed it in leers from the beginning of the text.
Our text document viewer can check the signature and alert the
user if the document shows as tampered.
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Fig. 11. (le) The accuracy of our CNN decoder changes as the resolution in
height of the leers increases. (right) Theoretical improvement of maximum
likelihood decoding (green) over the Chinese Remainder coding (orange).
8.2 Validation
Information capacity. As described in §5, we use n = 5 and k = 3
in our error-correction coding scheme. In every 5-leer block, if
the mutually prime numbers are pi , i = 1...5, then this block can
encode integers in [0,p1p2p3), where p1, p2, and p3 are the smallest
three numbers among all pi . us, this block can encode at most⌊
log2(p1p2p3)
⌋
bits of information.
To estimate the information capacity of our scheme for English
text, we randomly sample 5 characters from the alphabet to forming
a block. e characters are sampled based on the widely known
English leer frequencies (e.g., “e” is the most frequently used while
“z” is the least used) [Ferguson and Schneier 2003]. We compute the
average number of bits that can be encoded by a character. e result
is 1.77, suggesting that on average we need 73 leers to encode a
128-bit MD5 checksum for the application of digital signature (§7).
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Characters × 104
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Bit
s
× 104
Simple Binary Code
Our Coding Scheme
Next, we compare our coding scheme with
the simple approach discussed in §5.1. Re-
call that our method can correct at least
one error in a block of 5 leers, which
amounts to correcting log2(max si ) bits out
of the total
∑5
i=1 log2 si bits. e simple ap-
proach in §5.1 can store
∑5
i=1
⌊
log2 si
⌋
bits
of information. But in order to correct one
recognition error of the leer with the stan-
dard linear block codes, it needs to spend
2
⌈
log2(max si )
⌉
bits for adding redundancy,
leaving
∑5
i=1
⌊
log2 si
⌋−2 ⌈log2(max si )⌉ bits
to store information. We compare it with our
method using e Lord of e Rings, Chapter
1 as our input text, which contains in total 41682 useful leers (9851
words). As shown in the adjacent gure, as the number of leers
increases, our method can embed signicantly more information.
Decoding accuracy. We rst evaluate the glyph recognition accu-
racy of our CNNs. For every character, we print it repeatedly on a
paper with randomly chosen glyphs from the codebook and take
ve photos under dierent lighting conditions. Each photo has re-
gions of around 220px×220px containing a character. We use these
photos to test CNN recognition accuracy, and for all characters, the
accuracy is above 90%.
We also evaluate the decoding accuracy of our method. We ob-
served that decoding errors are mainly caused by image rasterization.
If the input document is in vector graphics format, the decoding
o
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Fig. 12. Decoding Probability. (top) A small region of photo to be de-
coded, where red boxes indicate recognition errors. (bottom) Each row
visualizes the probabilities of recognizing input glyphs (from the image) as
the perturbed glyphs. Along the x-axis, every bar corresponds to a perturbed
glyph in the codebook. The values on the y-axis are the output from our
CNNs. When an error occurs, the blue and red bars indicate the discrepancy
between the correctly and incorrectly recognized glyphs.
result is fully accurate, as we know the glyph outlines precisely.
us, we evaluate the decoding accuracy with pixel images. We
again use e Lord of e Rings, Chapter 1 to encode a random bit
string. We rasterize the resulting document into images with dier-
ent resolutions, and measure how many leers and blocks can be
decoded correctly. Fig. 11-le shows the testing result.
We also theoretically estimate the decoding robustness of our
maximum likelihood decoding method (§5.3). Suppose the probabil-
ity of correctly recognizing the glyph of a single leer is a constant
P1. e probability P2 of correctly decoding a single 5-leer block
can be derived analytically: if we only use Chinese Remainder De-
coding algorithm (§5.2), P2 is
(5
1
)
P41 (1 − P1). With the maximum
likelihood decoding (§5.3), P2 becomes
(5
2
)
P31 (1 − P1)2. e improve-
ment is visualized in Fig. 11-right.
Performance. We use tensorow[Abadi et al. 2015] with GPU
support to train and decode the input. It takes 0.89 seconds to
decode a text sequence with 176 leers (30 blocks). Our encoding
algorithm is running in a single thread CPU, taking 7.28 seconds for
the same length of leers.
Error correction improvement. In §5.3, we hypothesize that the
probability of recognizing an input pixel glyph f as a glyph u in
the codebook is proportional to the somax output of the CNNs.
We validated this hypothesis experimentally. Here we denote the
somax output value for recognizing f as a perturbed glyph u as
д(u, f ). As shown in Fig. 12 as an example, when f is mistakenly
recognized as u as opposed to its true glyph u∗, the probability
values д(u, f ) and д(u∗, f ) are both high (although d(u, f ) is higher)
and close to each other, indicating that f may be recognized as
u or u∗ with close probabilities. us, we conclude that using a
likelihood model proportional to д(u∗, f ) is reasonable.
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Fig. 13. Correcting 2 errors. We decode information from an input photo.
Red boxes indicate where recognition errors occur. While there exist one
block contains two errors, our decoding algorithm still successfully decodes.
Additionally, we extensively tested our decoding algorithm on
photos of text documents, and veried that it can successfully decode
all 5-leer blocks that have at most 2 errors. A small snapshot of
our tests is shown in Fig. 13.
8.3 Perceptual Evaluation
To evaluate the subjective distortion introduced by perturbing the
glyphs of a document, we conducted two user studies on MTurk.
Both studies follow the standard 2AFC protocol which is described
in §6 and has been used in other contexts.
Study A assesses the perceptual distortion of a perturbed glyph
with respect to a standard font. We prepare a set of paragraphs, and
the glyphs of each paragraph are from one of the six categories: (1)
the standard Times New Roman; (2-5) the perturbed glyphs from
four glyph codebooks, in which the thresholds used to select the
perceptually similar glyph candidates are 0.95, 0.85 (i.e., the value
we use in §6), 0.75, and 0.65, respectively; and (6) a dierent font
(Helvetica). e font size of each paragraph ranges from 25pt to
60pt, so the number of leers in the paragraphs varies. In each 2AFC
question, we present the MTurk rater three short paragraphs: one is
in standard Times New Roman, the other two are randomly chosen
from two of the six categories. We ask the rater to select from the
laer two paragraphs the one whose font is closest to standard Times
New Roman (shown in the rst paragraph). We assign 16 questions
of this type to each rater, and there were 169 raters participated. An
example question is included in the supplemental document.
Aer collecting the response, we use the same model (6) to quan-
tify the perceptual dierence of the paragraphs in each of the six
categories with respect to the one in standard Times New Roman.
In this case, si in Eq. (6) is the perceptual dierence of a category of
paragraphs to the paragraphs in standard Times New Roman. As
shown in Fig. 14, the results suggest that the glyphs in our code-
book (generated with a threshold of 0.85) lead to paragraphs that
are perceptually close to the paragraphs in original glyphs—much
3
4
5
6
Original 0.95 0.85 0.75 0.65 Helvetica
Fig. 14. User Study A. a to f are original font glyphs, 0.95, 0.85(we used),
0.75, 0.65, another dierent font, respectively.
4
5
6
Times
New Roman
Helvetica
7
Fig. 15. User Study B. We conduct user studies for four dierent fonts
simultaneously, and learn the scores of aesthetics when dierent types
of glyphs are used: Green bars indicate the original glyphs, orange bars
indicate the perturbed glyphs from our codebook, and purple bars indicate
the perturbed glyphs chosen by a lower perceptual threshold (i.e., 0.7).
closer than the glyphs selected by a lower threshold but almost as
close as the glyphs selected by a higher threshold (i.e., 0.95).
Study B assesses how much the use of perturbed glyphs in a
paragraph aects the aesthetics of its typeface. We prepare a set
of paragraphs whose glyphs are from one of the 12 categories: We
consider four dierent fonts (see Fig. 15). For each font, we generate
the glyphs in three ways, including (1) the unperturbed standard
glyph; (2) the perturbed glyphs from our codebook using a percep-
tual threshold of 0.85; and (3) the perturbed glyphs from a codebook
using a threshold of 0.7. In each 2AFC question, we present the
MTurk rater two short paragraphs randomly chosen from two of
the 12 categories, and ask the rater to select the paragraph whose
typeface is aesthetically more pleasing to them. We assign 16 ques-
tions of this type to each rater, and there were 135 participants. An
example question is also included in the supplemental document.
Again, using the logistic model (6), we quantify the aesthetics of
the typeface for paragraphs in the aforementioned three categories
of glyphs. Fig. 15 shows the results, indicating that, while the aes-
thetics are dierent across the four fonts, for each font paragraphs
using glyphs from our codebook (a threshold of 0.85) are aesthet-
ically comparable to the paragraphs in standard glyphs, whereas
using glyphs selected by a lower perceptual threshold signicantly
depreciates the typeface aesthetics.
We note that in order to identify untrustworthy raters, in both
user studies we include four control questions in each task assigned
to the raters, in a way similar to those described in §6.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have introduced a new technique for embedding additional in-
formation in text documents. Provided a user-specied message, our
method assigns each text leer an integer and embeds the integer by
perturbing the glyph of each leer according to a precomputed code-
book. Our method is able to correct a certain number of errors in the
decoding stage, through a new error-correction coding scheme built
on two algorithmic components: the Chinese Remainder coding
and the maximum likelihood decoding. We have demonstrated our
method with four applications, including text document metadata
storage, unobtrusive optical codes on text, symmetric-key encryp-
tion, and format-independent digital signatures.
Currently we only consider standard fonts such as regular Times
New Roman but not their variants such as Times New Roman Bold
Italic. We can treat those variants separately and include their
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perturbed glyphs in the codebook. en, our method will work with
those font variants.
When extracting messages from a rasterized text document, we
rely on the OCR library to detect and recognize the characters,
but we cannot recover any OCR detection error. If a character is
mistakenly recognized by the OCR, the integer embedded in that
character is lost, and our error-correction decoding may not be
able to recover the plain message since dierent characters have
dierent embedding capacities. However, in our experiments, the
OCR library always recognizes characters correctly.
If a part of the text is completely occluded from the camera, our
decoding algorithm will fail, as it needs to know how the text is split
into blocks. In the future, we hope to improve our coding scheme
so that it is able to recover from missing leers in the text as well.
In general, the idea of perturbing the glyphs for embedding mes-
sages can be applied to any symbolic system, such as other lan-
guages, mathematical equations, and music notes. It would be inter-
esting to explore similar embedding methods and their applications
for dierent languages and symbols.
Lastly, while our method is robust to format conversion, rasteri-
zation, as well as photograph and scan of printed papers, it suers
from the same drawback that almost all text steganographic meth-
ods have: if a text document is completely retyped, the embedded
information is destroyed.
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ALGORITHM 1: Confusion Test
1 Initialize glyph candidates C ; . §6
2 G ← A complete graph whose nodes represent the elements of C;
3 while true do
4 Q ←Random select M dierent pairs of nodes from C;
5 foreach pair (ui , uj ) in Q do
6 a ← Training accuracy of CNN described using (ui , uj ) ; . §4.4
7 if a < 0.95 then
8 remove edge (ui , uj ) from G ;
9 end
10 end
11 G ←Maximum Clique(G);
12 C ← glyphs corresponding to nodes in G ;
13 if No change to C then
14 break;
15 end
16 end
17 Train CNN using all elements in C;
18 Remove elements whose recognition test accuracy is lower than 0.9;
19 return C;
ALGORITHM 2: Decoding
Input :code vector r¯ = (r¯1, ...r¯n ), mutually prime integers
p = (p1, ...pn ), and M
Output :Decoded integer m
1 m˜ ← CRT (r¯ , p);
2 if m˜ < M then
3 m ← m˜;
4 return success;
5 else
6 Find codeword rˆ , where rˆ = minrˆ H (rˆ , r¯ );
7 if rˆ is not unique then
8 return fail;
9 else
10 m ← CRT (rˆ , p);
11 return success;
12 end
13 end
Peter Wayner. 1992. Mimic functions. Cryptologia 16, 3 (1992), 193–214.
Peter Wayner. 2009. Disappearing cryptography: information hiding: steganography &
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